Tuesday, January 25, 2022

The Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers’ Compensation has revised the Notification of Suspension or Modification Pursuant to 413 (c) & (d); form LIBC-751

This change is effective February 20, 2022.

What does this mean?  The form is simpler to use!

Here is a copy of the Bureau announcement -

On Dec. 22, 2021, Governor Tom Wolf signed Act 95 (House Bill 1837) into law. This act amended Section 413(c) & (d) of the PA Workers Compensation Act such that an affidavit is no longer required on the Notification of Suspension or Modification Pursuant to 413(c) & (d) - LIBC 751, effective February 20, 2022.


The Bureau of Workers Compensation has revised the Notification of Suspension or Modification, LIBC-751, to comply with Act 95. 

 

The notification now includes two verification boxes which must be checked before the document is signed. 

 

The notification must still be sent to the claimant and the bureau within seven days of the modification or suspension of benefits. 

 

Due to the substantive change to the form, the revised form must be used beginning February 20, 2022.

 After March 2, 2022, prior versions of the form will be marked incomplete.


Please upload completed forms into WCAIS. Filing in WCAIS is available 24/7 and reflects a "filed date" when uploaded. This practice offers cost savings,

timely filing to the bureau without the need for a valid US Post Mark and makes the document available for instant viewing by all parties to the claim. Uploading can be done within the Action Tab of a claim, using the "Document Type" Notification of Suspension or Modification (LIBC-751) in the tab's drop-down list. The form may also be mailed to the bureau for filing.

Here is a reproduction of the “new” sections – 

NOTIFICATION OF SUSPENSION OR MODIFICATION PURSUANT              TO §§ 413 (c) & (d)  LIBC-751 REV 12-21

INSTRUCTIONS

This form must be completed, mailed to the employee, and uploaded to WCAIS or mailed to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation within seven days of the suspension or modification of benefits under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. You must submit an EDI transaction to match the LIBC-751 to update the status of the claim in WCAIS.

*** 

You are notified that because you returned to work on  month day year  your weekly disability benefits for this injury have been:

 __  Suspended effective month day year  because you have returned to work at earnings equal to or greater       

        than your time- of-injury earnings of $._____.

 OR

__  Modified to the rate of $ ____ per week, effective month day year  because you returned to work at earnings

       less than your time-of-injury earnings.

 *** 

 ___   I confirm I have served a copy of this form to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.

___    I confirm I have served a copy of this form to the employee.

***                                             

Claims representative’s signature                                                   

Claims representative’s name (typed/printed) 

phone number

This Insurer’s Verification language appears to the right of the Claim rep signature lines -

 INSURER’S VERIFICATION

I verify that this information is true and correct based upon my knowledge, information and belief. I understand false statements are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. Section 4904 relating to unsworn falsifications to authorities. Any individual filing misleading or incomplete information knowingly and with intent to defraud is in violation of Section 1102 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Act and may also be subject to criminal and civil penalties through Pennsylvania Act 165 of 1994.

If you have any questions regarding the proper usage, preparation or filing of this revised form – please feel free to ask your workers compensation attorney at www.ChartwellLaw.com 

Friday, January 21, 2022

2022 Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation - State Wide Average Weekly Wage and Total Disability Benefit Rates

 
Pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act, Section 105.1, the Department of Labor & Industry has determined the statewide average weekly wage for injuries occurring on and after January 1, 2022, shall be $1,205.00 per week.  

The maximum weekly compensation rate for calendar year 2022 is $1,205.00. 

The weekly compensation rate is 66 2/3 percent of the employee's average weekly wage if the average weekly wage falls between $1,807.50 and $903.76.

The weekly compensation rate is $602.50 if the employee's average weekly wage is between $903.75 and $669.44.

If the employee's average weekly wage is $669.43 or less; the weekly compensation rate is 90 percent of the employee's average weekly wage.

 NOTE: For purposes of calculating the update to payments for medical treatment rendered on and after January 1, 2022, the percentage increase in the Statewide Average Weekly Wage is 6.6 percent.

Tuesday, January 4, 2022

PA Employers are not entitled to workers' comp benefit credit for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation paid under the CARES Act

Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation paid to an Employee under the CARES Act is not equivalent to "Unemployment Compensation Benefits" for which an Employer is entitled to a credit under Section 204(a) of the PA Act.

See: Carbon Lehigh Intermediate Unit #21 v. WCAB (Waardal), a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision published at No. 750 C.D. 2021; filed on January 3, 2022.

HOLDING: The sole issue before the Court was whether Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation under the CARES Act is the equivalent to UC benefits for which a PA Employer is entitled to a credit under Section 204(a) of the Workers Compensation Act.

The Carbon Lehigh decision relied upon its prior analysis iDietrich Industries, Inc. v. WCAB (Shank) (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) to conclude that no credit is available to the Employer for the CARES benefits paid. In Shank the Court disallowed a credit under Section 204(a) for federally funded trade readjustment allowance (TRA) benefits a claimant received.

The Carbon Lehigh decision arose from Employer's  appeal of the WCAB order affirming the WCJ decision to deny the Employer a credit against its payment of workers’ compensation benefits for the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation that Claimant received pursuant to Section 2104(b)(1) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 9023(b)(1).

REASONING of the COURT

As one may have anticipated, the Commonwealth Court relied upon its decision at Shank to deny the Employer a credit in the instant matter.

In Shank the claimant received sickness and accident benefits following a work-related lower back injury along with UC benefits and TRA benefits, which “were intended to supplement state unemployment insurance benefits.” Shank’s receipt of TRA benefits was subject to various statutory requirements, including exhaustion of his entitlement to “unemployment insurance benefits.”

Shank’s employer sought a credit against workers’ compensation in the amount of Shank’s UC and TRA benefits. A WCJ granted the credit for Shank’s sickness and accident and UC benefits but disallowed a credit for his TRA benefits.

The Commonwealth Court analyzed the employer’s right to a credit under Section 204(a). The Court noted that TRA benefits, which were intended to supplement UC benefits, were funded entirely by the federal government, as was the cost of administering the TRA program. 

Shank’s Employer argued that the funding source for Shank’s TRA benefits was irrelevant, as Section 204(a) made no such distinction when mandating a credit for a claimant’s receipt of UC benefits. The Court disagreed, stating that an Employer’s credit against its obligation to pay workers’ compensation stems from its payment of “regular stated amounts, out of its own general funds or from sick or accident benefits,” which do not constitute “wages or salary for work performed, but which are paid in relief of the employee’s incapacity to work.”

The Court further reasoned that TRA benefits were not among the types of payments delineated in Section 204(a) from which an employer could seek a credit towards its workers’ compensation obligation. They recognized that, where certain items are specifically designated in a statute, omissions are understood to be excluded. Having concluded that TRA benefits were “distinct from the type of benefits contemplated” under Section 204(a), the Court affirmed the denial of a credit to the Employer.

In support of its right to a credit for Claimant’s receipt of Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, this Employer essentially resurrects the argument the Court rejected in Shank – that Section 204(a) makes no distinction as to the funding source of a claimant’s UC benefits.

The Court stated – “We are similarly unpersuaded by Employer’s attempts to distinguish this matter from our holding in Shank”. They found it was noteworthy that Pandemic Compensation is available to individuals who are not otherwise eligible to receive “regular” UC benefits, and the CARES Act provides for federal reimbursement of the amounts paid by a state for Pandemic Compensation. Furthermore, Pandemic Compensation is referenced separately from “regular compensation” throughout the relevant provisions of the CARES Act.

The Court concluded that these distinctions render Pandemic Compensation sufficiently “distinct from the type of benefits contemplated” under Section 204(a) of the Act.

It was acknowledged that Section 204(a), which was last amended in 1996, did not contemplate the benefits at issue here. However, it is clear that the General Assembly has not seen fit to amend Section 204(a) in the two decades following the decision in Shank, so as to specify that the credit provisions of Section 204(a) encompass the types of federally funded benefits at issue in Shank and the instant matter.

Ultimately, the legislative intent behind Section 204(a) is to prevent an employer from having to pay “duplicate benefits for the same loss of earnings.” (emphasis added). Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bascovsky), (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Disallowing a credit for Pandemic Compensation that is wholly paid for by another entity does no disservice to the overall purpose of Section 204(a), nor does it place Employer in the position of “paying duplicate benefits for the same loss of earnings.”


Friday, December 3, 2021

Supreme Court of PA reviewed the scope of Employer liability for a traveling employee injury after attendance at an Employer-sponsored social event.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently reviewed the scope of an Employer’s liability for an injury sustained after a traveling employee attended an Employer-sponsored social event.

As we approach the time of the year for Employer-sponsored Holiday and End-of -the- Year social gatherings, the analysis of the traveling employee doctrine by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is both informative and instructive for employers, insurers and workers’ compensation practitioners.


See: PETERS v. WCAB (CINTAS CORPORATION), No. 1 MAP 2020; 
DECIDED: November 17, 2021, authored by JUSTICE MUNDY 
(Appeal from the Commonwealth Court at No. 1835 CD 2017 dated July 18, 2019 Affirming the decision of the WCAB at No.A16-1263 dated November 16, 2017.)

HOLDING:

An Employee who travels in the course of their work-related duties is presumed to remain within the scope of employment when attending an Employer-sponsored social event. An Employer is responsible for injury sustained by the Employee, after his departure from that work-related event - if he did not abandon his employment prior to the accident, via actions which “were so foreign to and removed from his usual employment that they constitute an abandonment of that employment.”

This case was remanded to the WCJ for additional fact-finding to resolve the conflicting testimony of the Employee and his sales manager, as to whether the Employee was traveling back to his home or traveling to/from another non-work event, at the time of his accident.

Although there was no announcement of a new rule of law, or even a final determination in this specific case, the analysis employed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is instructive for Employers and their Workers’ Compensation insurers, when assessing issues of responsibility for injury occurring in work-related travel and social function attendance.

Factual Background

Factual distinctions may determine the compensability of an injury. In the instant case, the facts reflect that this Employee was engaged in work-related travel as a regular part of his work duties. He was employed as a uniform sales representative, which included three half-days in the Employer’s office and travel for the remainder of the work week, to meet with potential customers and present products in his sales region.

Following his last sales appointment, Employee drove pass the highway exit to his home, on his way to an Employer-sponsored event at a local pub. After leaving that event, the Employee was injured in a motor vehicle accident. A claim petition was filed to seek benefits, as Employee alleged the motor vehicle accident occurred during the course of his employment.

Employee testified that his sales manager invited the sales representatives to this pub event. Employee described this event as a celebration to mark the end of a “sales blitz”. These types of events were held on prior occasions during sales blitzes.  He believed these events to be “sort of” mandatory. At the event, he said there was a recap of the work performed during the sales blitz. Food and drinks were paid by the Employer. Employee testified that after he left the event he was involved in a motor vehicle accident, which occurred on his way home.

Conflicting testimony was presented regarding the description and nature of the pub event. Employer testimony from a sales representative and a Sales Manager confirmed this type of event was routinely held during sales blitzes, as a “voluntary perk”. Contrary to the Employee’s testimony, they both emphasized the voluntariness and social nature of the event. They described this as a chance for the sales representatives to relax after the sales blitz. They disputed the Employee’s representation that the sales blitz work was recapped at the event.  The sales representative specifically testified that work was not discussed during the event, rather the conversations were general “chit chat.” 

The Sales Manager testified that he received a call from the Employee later that evening, reporting that he had been in a motor vehicle accident. Significantly, He further testified that during this phone conversation that Employee stated that he was not on his way home from the pub event at the time of the motor vehicle accident, but rather he was on his way from some other event. However, the Sales Manager testified that he could not recall specifically where the Employee said he was coming from. (this becomes relevant in the final analysis of this claim).

Supreme Court Analysis

As noted above, the Supreme Court did not announce a new rule of law regarding the scope of compensability of injury sustained by a traveling employee. As a starting point in its analysis, the Supreme Court cited Section 301(a) of the Act, for the proposition that an employer is liable for compensation for injury or death sustained in the course of one’s employment. An employee’s injury is considered to have arisen in the course of employment in the following two circumstances: 

When an employee is injured on or off the employer’s premises while engaged in furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs; 

When an employee is not furthering the employer’s business or affairs but nonetheless  is on the premises occupied or under the control of the employer; upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on; 

When required by the nature of his employment to be present on his employer’s premises; and sustained injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon. (301(a). 

In the litigation of a claim petition, the injured worker has the burden of proof to demonstrate that his/her injury was sustained in the course of employment.

In the instant case this Employee was injured off Employer’s premises. Therefore, for this accident to be considered to have “arisen in the course of his employment”, the Employee must have been furthering the business and affairs of the Employer at the time of his motor vehicle accident.

The Traveling Employee Presumption

The Supreme Court reviewed the historical development of the traveling employee doctrine. Employee argued that he was in the course of his employment at the time of his motor vehicle accident, pursuant to this doctrine.

The traveling employee doctrine provides:

When a traveling employee is injured after setting out on the business of his employer,  it is presumed that he was furthering the employer’s business at the time of the injury. The employer bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. To meet its burden, the employer must prove that the employee’s actions were so foreign to and removed from his usual employment that they constitute an abandonment of that employment.

Temporary departures from the work route for the purpose of administering to the comforts of an off-the-premises employee, including authorized breaks for lunch, will not interrupt the continuity of the one’s course of employment.

For example, a traveling salesperson cannot carry out the business of the employer without traveling to present products and solicit business. As such, the act of traveling, in and of itself, furthers the business and affairs of a traveling employee’s employer. So too do the activities incidental to travel such as lodging, refueling, and stopping for food and drink. During their travels, traveling employees are subject to the risks associated with travel that stationary employees are not. Therefore, the “hazards of travel become the hazards of employment”. See:  Ball-Foster Glass Container Co.

Application of the Traveling Employee Doctrine

The Supreme Court rejected the Employer’s argument (and the WCJ, WCAB and Commonwealth Court conclusion) that this Employee abandoned his employment when he passed the highway exit to his home and proceeded to the pub event, as his attendance was not mandatory for his employment nor was the event “work-related.”

It was not disputed that this individual was a traveling employee. As such, he is presumed to remain in the course of his employment, unless the employer rebuts the presumption by showing that his actions, at some point prior to the injury, constituted abandonment of his employment.

The Supreme Court concluded that this Employee did not abandon his employment by attending the pub event. The WCJ found testimony was credible that these types of events were regularly held during sales blitzes. The Court reasoned that it would be difficult to conclude that attending a regularly held type of event constituted an act so foreign to and removed from his regular employment to be considered abandonment of employment.

Also, the WCJ found the event to be voluntary and social in nature. However, those facts, do not mean the event was not work related! The Employer hosted and sponsored the event. While work may not have been discussed at the event, the event still benefited Employer by fostering relationships and improving morale. See: Investors Diversified Services.

The Supreme Court could not conclude that this Employee abandoned his employment by attending the pub event. But their analysis did not end there, as there remains a question as to whether the Employee abandoned his employment sometime between leaving the pub event and the occurrence of the motor vehicle accident.

The record reflects conflicting testimony as to where this Employee was coming from at

the time of the motor vehicle accident. The WCJ did not explicitly resolve this conflicting testimony. As the conflicting witness testimony was unresolved, this leaves open the question of whether the Employee took some action after leaving the pub event that could constitute abandonment of his employment.

As often stated, “the WCJ is the ultimate finder of fact and the exclusive arbiter of credibility and evidentiary weight". The Supreme Court remanded this case to the WCJ to resolve the conflicting testimony with respect to whether the Employee was coming from the pub event at the time of his accident or coming from some other unknown non-work event.

Recommendations:

1.    This decision was not an announcement of a new rule of law regarding the extent of compensability for injury to a traveling employee. Rather, this decision reflects an analysis of the existing law with application to the specific facts presented, to reach a different conclusion regarding the compensability of an injury sustained after attendance at a work event.

To properly assess the compensability of an injury to a traveling employee, the Work Comp professional must engage in a thorough investigation of the facts, including the past practices of the Employer.

2.    The assessment of responsibility for injury to a non-traveling employee, sustained after attendance at a work-related event is different.

As cited by the Supreme Court, in the past, a non-traveling employee, injured after attendance at a work related event, may not be in the course of employment after the event has ended and the employee is traveling home. 

Citing: Brown v. WCAB (Liken Employment Nursing Services) (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991), and Canning v. WCAB (Pa. Senate) (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) The claimant in Brown, who was not a traveling employee, was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing a public roadway after leaving her employer’s annual Christmas party held at the employer’s office. The Commonwealth Court concluded that even if the party benefited the employer by cultivating interpersonal relationships, the claimant was not furthering her employer’s business at the time of her accident because she was injured while returning from the employer’s party and not while attending the social event.

Query: would the result in Brown be different after the Peters decision ?

What about the “special mission” line of cases, which can expand the Employer’s liability to a non-traveling employee?

In preparation of one's defense to a claim, one must carefully investigate the facts presented regarding: (i) the details of the employment; (ii) the details of the event; (iii) the past practices of the Employer regarding events.

 

 

 

 

Tuesday, November 23, 2021

Two PA Appellate Court Decisions affirm the denial of Claim Petitions where the WCJ authored a reasoned decision.

Two Recent Commonwealth Court decisions provide similar reasoning for the affirmation of the denial of claim petitions by the Workers Compensation Judge.

The Commonwealth Court emphasized that the "Reasoned Decision" standard for review of live testimony does not require the articulation of specific reasons for rejection of testimony that was found to be not credible.

Also the WCJ does not err in failing to make a specific credibility determination of the Employer medical evidence – where the claimant does not meet his/her burden of proof.

Beristain v. WCAB (Broadcom Inc.): No. 46 C.D. 2021;  Memorandum Opinion filed: November 15, 2021

In Beristain, the Claimant appealed the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) order which affirmed the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) denial of Claim petition. The issue on appeal was whether the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision under Section 422(a) of the Act. upon review, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the claim denial.

The Claimant petition alleged he suffered a work injury of lumbar disc protrusions caused by the repetitive nature of his job. Claimant’s job duties consisted of polishing and grinding lightweight silicon wafers, which required that he stand and lean forward while rotating his upper body.

The WCJ rejected Claimant’s testimony as not credible based on his personal observation of Claimant. Claimant's medical witness - Dr. Grodofsky was also deemed not credible to establish a causal connection between work duties and Claimant's lumbar spine condition.The WCJ noted that Dr.Grodofsky’s knowledge of Claimant’s work duties came exclusively from Claimant, whose testimony was discredited. The WCJ reasoned that Dr. Grodofsky lacked sufficient knowledge of Claimant’s work duties to support his opinion that their repetitive nature caused the alleged work injury.

Employer's medical expert was Dr. Componovo. In his IME report he stated a MRI showed a disc protrusion at the L5-S1 level but he did not believe this finding was responsible for Claimant’s symptoms. The MRI findings were “extremely mild,” and he did not correlate this finding with Claimant’s subjective complaints. Further, Dr. Componovo was not aware of any mechanism of injury or work exposure that would have caused Claimant’s symptoms. He felt that Claimant’s symptoms were “more likely than not” unrelated to his job.

On Appeal, Claimant argued the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision as: (1) the WCJ did not articulate his reasons for finding Claimant’s testimony not credible, and (2) he did not make any credibility determinations with regard to the testimony of Employer’s expert, Dr. Componovo. .

Commonwealth Court Reasoning

The Commonwealth Court analysis began with a review of the well established principle that the burden of proof in an original claim petition rests on the claimant to prove all the elements necessary to support an award of benefits under the Act. Inglis House v. WCAB (Reedy) (Pa. 1993). The claimant’s burden to prove disability never shifts to the employer. See: Morrison v. WCAB (Rothman Inst.) (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

An equally well established legal standard is the Section 422(a) requirement that the WCJ issue a decision that allows for adequate review by the appellate courts. Daniels v. WCAB (Tristate Transp.)(Pa. 2003). When the WCJ has the advantage of seeing the witnesses testify and assessing their demeanor, a mere conclusion as to which witness was deemed credible is sufficient to render the decision adequately reasoned under Section 422(a).

In the instance case, Claimant argued, without citation to relevant legal authority, that the WCJ’s rejection of Claimant’s live testimony necessitated additional fact finding beyond the standard articulated in Daniels. The Commonwealth Court stated there is no merit to Claimant's argument. The WCJ is not compelled to specify the basis for his rejection of Claimant’s testimony.

Claimant also argued the WCJ erred when he failed to address Dr. Componovo’s testimony. Claimant asserted this testimony corroborates his evidence that he suffered a compensable work injury.

The Commonwealth Court concluded that the WCJ did not err when he failed to render a credibility determination regarding the testimony of Dr. Componovo. Although Section 422(a) required the WCJ to make “findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a whole,” he was not required to address all the evidence presented. See: Montgomery Tank Lines v. WCAB (Humphries), 792 (Pa. Cmwlth.2002). The WCJ only had to make the findings necessary to resolve the issues raised by the evidence and relevant to the decision. 

***

A second recent Commonwealth Court reported at Sufran v. WCAB (C&S Wholesale);  Memorandum Opinion filed November 15, 2021, articulated a similar analysis and reasoning in the affirmation of another claim petition denial. 

In Sufran, the Claimant appealed WCAB order which affirmed the WCJ decision to deny a Claim petition. The WCJ found that she failed to establish she sustained a work injury. The Claim petition alleged a work-related injury, in the nature of: a rotator cuff sprain; right and left knee pain; upper right arm pain; a knee sprain, which she allegedly sustained while working as a selector for Employer.

The WCJ denied the Claim petition, rejecting Claimant’s live testimony as not credible. This credibility determination was the basis for the WCJ’s rejection of Dr. Levinstein’s testimony, as his understanding of the alleged work injury was based on information Claimant provided. TheWCJ found the testimony of Dr. Levinstein was not credible as his testimony that Claimant did not return to work after February 24, 2017, was contradicted by Claimant’s testimony. Dr. Levinstein opined that Claimant’s alleged work injury was caused by the repetitiveness of her work duties; however, no evidence was presented that established the repetitive nature of those duties. Dr. Levinstein diagnosed and treated Claimant, even though his initial examination failed to reveal any objective findings.

The WCJ rejected Claimant’s and Dr. Levinstein’s testimony as not credible. On this basis,  the WCJ did not address the credibility of Employer medical witness, Dr. Mauthe. The WCJ found there was no credible evidence that Claimant suffered a work injury in the course and scope of her employment. Claimant failed to meet her burden of proof

On appeal Claimant argued: (1) the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision as the WCJ did not adequately explain his credibility determinations with respect to Claimant’s and Dr. Levinstein’s testimony; (2) the WCJ’s brief statement rejecting Claimant’s live testimony does not permit adequate appellate review; (3) the WCJ’s credibility findings as to Dr. Levinstein cannot be properly reviewed absent further explanation regarding Claimant’s credibility, given that Dr. Levinstein’s testimony was rejected in part because it relied on Claimant’s information; (4) the WCJ erred when he failed to make any findings or render a credibility determination of Dr. Mauthe’s testimony.

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the denial of the Claim petition and explained that as Claimant testified live before the WCJ - who assessed Claimant’s demeanor and concluded that “Claimant’s live testimony was not credible" -  under the Daniels standard , the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant lacked credibility is sufficient, and, therefore, the reasoned decision requirement under Section 422(a) was satisfied.

In regards to Claimant's argument with respect to Dr. Levinstein’s testimony, the WCJ clearly articulated multiple objective bases for his credibility determination. While Dr. Levinstein opined that Claimant’s alleged work injury was caused by the repetitive nature of her work duties, Claimant presented no evidence in this regard. Finally, the WCJ found that Dr. Levinstein diagnosed and treated Claimant despite an apparent lack of objective findings in his initial examination.

The Court reasoned, that once the WCJ rejected the testimony of Claimant and Dr. Levinstein as not credible, there was no further evidence of record that Claimant could have relied on to satisfy her burden of proof. Because Claimant failed to offer credible evidence in support of her claim petition, it was not necessary for the WCJ to assess Dr. Mauthe’s credibility to render a reasoned decision.

Practice Pointers:

1. Yes, it is possible to succeed in the litigation of a Pennsylvania workers compensation claim petition. 

One must present sufficient evidence to allow the Workers' Compensation Judge to conclude that the Claimant's medical expert opinion is not based upon the facts established by the evidence.

One may also prevail when conflicting medical expert opinions are presented. If the Employer presents an unequivocal medical expert opinion - which is found to be credible by the Workers' Compensation Judge -  then conflicting evidence may be resolved in favor of the Employer's position. 

2. A successful claim petition litigation result begins with an investigation of the accident circumstances, followed by the discovery of all pertinent medical records and the retention of a medical expert, who will review and address all of the issues presented. 

Thursday, October 28, 2021

Pennsylvania Employers – Now is a good time to review your Post-Injury Drug Testing Procedures & Policies.

 

Pennsylvania Employers – Now is a good time to review your Post-Injury Drug Testing Procedures & Policies.

A recent Commonwealth Court decision considered an employee’s entitlement to wage loss benefits when he was  terminated for noncompliance with the Employer’s post-injury drug-testing policy.

See: Bear Staffing v. WCAB (Shawn Logan): No. 949 C.D. 2020; Memorandum Opinion, not reported; Filed October 15, 2021.

The Commonwealth Court concluded the Workers’ Compensation Judge properly determined that the Employer failed to meet its burden of proving that Claimant was discharged for work-related misconduct, the misconduct being his noncompliance with the Employer’s post-injury drug-testing policy. The WCJ’s found the reasons for Employer’s termination of Claimant were not “credible”.  As the WCJ has sole authority over issues of credibility of witnesses, this finding and conclusion was not reviewed by the Court on appeal.

The facts presented warrant our further review...

Factual and Procedural History

Claimant worked for a temporary employment agency, which assigned him to work at a chocolates manufacturer. Claimant slipped and fell, striking his head and back on the ground. He sustained injuries to his head, neck, and lower back. A Claim petition was filed and Employer filed a timely answer. Employer issued an amended Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable; Medical-Only (NTCP-MO), acknowledging Claimant’s work-related injury. Employer subsequently filed a Petition to Terminate based upon it’s IME results.

One day post-injury, Claimant was directed to a drug test at WorkNet in accordance with Employer’s policies.  A WorkNet employee testified she took Claimant through the drug and alcohol testing. A breathalyzer test for the presence of alcohol, returned no indications. For the drug screening, Claimant was required to provide a urine sample. The first sample exceeded the 100-degree temperature threshold for an acceptable sample. The Employer policies required Claimant to provide a second sample under observation. Claimant said he was unable to provide another sample right away, so he was given some water and waited.

A male physician was available to observe Claimant when he provided the second sample. Claimant and the physician went into a bathroom. Shortly thereafter, they came out and Claimant appeared angry. He declared the observation was an invasion of his privacy. Claimant did not provide a second urine sample. The WorkNet employee testified the original sample was outside the required temperature range. As a second sample was not obtained, the drug testing was not completed.

The physician also testified regarding the procedures. He has encountered people who have difficulty providing a second sample as they recently urinated and/or assert that they cannot do so while someone is watching them. The physician testified he went with Claimant and Claimant stated that he was uncomfortable being observed. Claimant appeared angry and objected to “an invasion of his privacy’. He cautioned Claimant that this was something that could cause him to lose his job, but Claimant left without providing a second urine sample.

Employer’s Executive Vice President and COO, testified about its drug-testing policy and the actions after Claimant’s testing. The Employer policies concerning drug and alcohol testing following work-related injuries are covered in the hiring process. Claimant signed an acknowledgment of these policies when he was hired.

When Claimant was released for restricted duty work, he sent a letter to Claimant, indicating the Employer was unable to offer Claimant future work due to his failure to comply with the post-injury drug-testing policy. Mr. Johnson testified the termination of Claimant’s employment was due solely to the violation of the policy. If Claimant had not violated their policy, Employer would have found work for Claimant within his restrictions, without a loss in earnings.

Workers’ Compensation Judge Decision

The WCJ found that “Claimant is also credible and convincing that he was not purposefully refusing to provide a urine sample as required by . . . Employer’s work policy.” The WorkNet employee and physician were found to be credible regarding their attempts to obtain a second urine sample; however, the WCJ credited Claimant’s testimony “as to Claimant’s inability to provide the second urine sample and not his refusal to provide that sample.”

The WCJ found that Claimant met his burden of proof to establish he sustained work-related injuries that rendered him unable to perform his job. The WCJ concluded, Employer failed to establish that Claimant fully recovered from his work injuries. (Claimant’s medical evidence  reflected diagnoses of: a scalp contusion, post-concussive syndrome, post-traumatic cephalgia, cervical strain/sprain, thoracic sprain/strain, lumbosacral strain/sprain with evidence of radiculopathy).

The Appeal Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision, reasoning the WCJ determined that Claimant’s discharge from employment resulted from his inability rather than his bad faith refusal to comply with Employer’s drug-testing policy. The Employer failed to establish the requisite “bad faith willful misconduct” necessary for the suspension of Claimant’s disability benefits.

Commonwealth Court Reasoning for its Conclusions

On appeal Employer argued the WCJ erred in awarding Claimant ongoing disability benefits where he was terminated for failing to comply with Employer’s drug-testing policy, as his termination, rather than his injury, was the cause of his subsequent wage loss.

Employer acknowledged the WCJ made credibility determinations regarding Claimant’s inability to provide a second urine sample - but this should not be the end of the analysis, as the WCJ also credited the WorkNet employee and physician descriptions of the Claimant’s failure to provide a second sample, including Claimant’s angry behavior and use of profanity. Employer argued this demonstrated that Claimant refused to cooperate with the testing and there was a lack of good faith.

Employer argued it terminated Claimant and was unable to offer him future work due to his failure to comply with the drug-testing policy - this was the sole reason for his loss of earnings.

Employer compared this case to Edwards v. WCAB (Sear’s Logistic Services) (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) where an employee sustained a work injury and took a post-injury drug test, which indicated his use of an illegal drug. Employer terminated him due to this result. The Court affirmed the suspension of benefits following his employment termination, as the employee “was discharged for violating the employer’s policy prohibiting a use of illegal drugs. His loss of earnings after discharge was a result of his own action, not the work injury”.

In the instant case, the Court did not reverse the benefit award based upon Edwards, as this WCJ credited Claimant’s explanation that he was unable to provide a second urine sample while being observed, and that he did not intentionally refuse to comply with Employer’s drug-testing policy.

When an employer alleges the claimant’s loss of earnings is the result of a post-injury involuntary discharge, the employer has the burden of proving that suitable work was available or would have been available, but for, the circumstances which lead to the claimant’s discharge.See: Reyes v. WCAB (AMTEC) (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) quoting Second Breath v. WCAB (Gurski) (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

A claimant is not entitled to disability benefits where the loss of earnings is a result of a discharge for bad faith conduct that was committed by the claimant subsequent to the injury or was not known to the employer until after the injury. See;  Vista International Hotel v. WCAB (Daniels) (Pa. 1999) and BJ’s Wholesale Club v. WCAB (Pearson)(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

The WCJ must determine whether a claimant was discharged for conduct evidencing a lack of good faith. This is a question of fact to be determined by the WCJ.

The Court noted the short-coming in this Employer’s argument is that case precedents emphasize the initial credibility determination of the WCJ, in his role as fact-finder, as to whether the claimant acted in bad faith with respect to an employer’s rule or policy, resulting in the discharge. See, e.g., Vista International Hotel, 742 A.2d at 659.

The Court concluded  the WCJ properly determined that employer failed to meet its burden of proving that claimant was discharged for work-related misconduct. The WCJ specifically found the reasons for employer’s termination of claimant were not credible.

The WCJ expressly credited Claimant’s testimony that he did not intentionally refuse to comply with the drug-testing policy. Instead he was unable to comply as he could not produce a second urine sample while observed. The WCJ’s findings support the conclusion that Claimant did not act in bad faith with respect to the Employer’s drug test policy, even though his failure to comply resulted in his termination.  Once again, the Court emphasized the WCJ has sole authority over issues of credibility of witnesses.

PRACTICE POINTERS:

       1.        We recommend review of the Employer post-injury drug testing policies with your legal counsel and Human Resources professionals.

       2.        Address this issue of an Employee asserting he/she is unable to provide a first or second urine sample. Do your testing policies require observation of the employee? Are there alternative policies or procedures that will allow for valid testing?

       3.        A simple Google search - will identify the validity issues raised by the receipt of a urine sample that exceeds the 100-degree temperature threshold for an acceptable sample.

Review the testing procedures utilized to maintain the test site integrity.

 

Monday, October 4, 2021

Important PA Work Comp Update: Notification of Suspension/Modification; LIBC-751 form must be Notarized. COVID suspension of Notary Requirement has ended.

 Bureau of Workers Compensation message - 

Notary Requirement for LIBC-751

(Notification of Modification/Suspension)

as of Oct. 1, 2021

 

As of Sept. 30, 2021, the suspension of regulations governing the notary requirement on the Notification of Suspension/Modification (LIBC-751) ended. As of Oct. 1, 2021, the signature required on the LIBC-751 should be properly notarized.

The Notification of Suspension or Modification Pursuant to Section (C) & (D); LIBC-751 form allows the Employer and Insurer to suspension or modify the indemnity wage loss benefit status of the injured worker, upon a return to work, without the necessity of having the worker sign a document. 

The LIBC- 751 document must be signed by the employer, notarized and filed within seven (7) days of the return to work. The Notice must be provided to the worker.

If the worker disputes the change of status, a "challenge" may be filed within 20 days by completing the appropriate section of the LIBC form. A prompt hearing will be scheduled before a Workers' Compensation Judge. 

In the WCJ Challenge hearing, the only issue before the WCJ is the worker's status. If the worker is no longer employed  or working at reduced wages, indemnity wage loss benefits will be reinstated.

If the Employer/Insurer wishes to pursue a Suspension or Modification remedy - they must file a separate petition.